Abstract
Introduction
The number of new software vulnerabilities found in commonly used software continues to be alarmingly high, and statistics from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) show that more than 5500 new vulnerability instances were reported and registered by NVD in 2008 1 . One reason for the many vulnerabilities that are prevalent in today's software is believed to be a general lack of security focus in the early development phases of software projects [1] . This is similar to claims by Firesmith [2] , who says that most requirements engineers do not have a proper training in security and that security requirements -if they are specified at all -often set architecture and design constraints rather than give guidance and support to the implementation of the best fit security mechanisms.
It is important to raise the security awareness of development teams as early as possible in a project life cycle [3] , and it is shown that building security in from start is less expensive than fixing mistakes once the software is shipped to market [4] . Threat modeling is one security activity that can be used in several stages of the software development process, including the initial analysis and requirement phase, and consequently an alternative for raising early security awareness.
Firesmith [5] suggests that applications tend to have the same kinds of assets, and that these assets are subject to the same basic kinds of threats. Experienced security experts have 1 . http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/statistics extensive knowledge on existing threats and how to protect different assets from these. This kind of expertise is highly valuable to development teams, however, a problem is that many teams do not have security experts available. With our research we attempt to make threat models more understandable and available to software developers, and thereby provide easy access to security knowledge that is needed to build more secure software systems. Our work is part of the SHIELDS project 2 , which aims to bridge the gap between software developers and security experts. The idea is to provide security knowledge in the form of reusable security models and tool artefacts aimed at different software development phases, and these resources will be made available through an online repository. The basis for our ideas within this paper is that security experts produce and link threat models, i.e. security knowledge, documented via easily understandable, informative models, which can be reused by software developers and development teams to acquire the information they need.
While researchers have developed many tools and methods for incorporating security focus and activities into software development, the adoption rate in terms of use in real software development processes remains unimpressive. A possible explanation for this is that we lack a comprehensive framework that explains what methods to use, why and when, and that is accessible to software developers. At current time we do not believe that it is possible to create such a framework. There is a lack of experience and empirical studies. This makes it difficult to compare and select proposed methods in order to determine "best practice" for such a framework.
In this paper we present a contribution towards being able to select "best practice" methods. We address how existing threat models, i.e. misuse cases (based on UML use cases) [6] and attack trees [7] , can be used together and linked to show both high-level and more detailed threats towards common software functionality. We also show how threats can be linked to UML activity diagrams to model development activities used for threat mitigation purposes. Our approach allows tracing software functionality to threats -both high level and technical -and then find the correct and detailed threat mitigation activity. To our knowledge this is unique. We present results from a limited evaluation studying reusability of threat models. Future evaluations are planned to collect more experience.
In the remainder of this paper an overview of models and resources available for use in the requirement phase of software projects is given in Section 2. Then we present our approach focusing on interlinking of models in Section 3. Section 4 provides an example of how we envision developers can utilise our approach. A brief introduction to an experiment where some of the results are relevant to this paper is given in Section 5. Then we discuss our contribution in Section 6, and conclude the paper in Section 7.
Theory
In this section we provide an overview of existing work on threat modelling. We consider all models that represent threats or attacks towards systems as being threat models, and in the following we have a particular focus on misuse cases and attack trees. The aim of this section is to explain why misuse case diagrams and attack trees have been selected as the focus of our work and why we have chosen to combine their use. We also give a brief overview of models of countermeasures or security activities. Additionally we point at some online resources that provide reusable resources that can be utilised in the modelling work.
Threat models
Several model types have been suggested for modelling threats, attacks and the like as a basis for identifying security requirements. Attack trees as suggested by Schneier [7] , and the similar concept of threat trees [8] , model attack goals and ways to achieve them in a tree structure. Misuse cases [6] and the similar abuse cases [9] build on the UML use cases that have proved effective for identifying functional requirements, and use them to model system abuse. Braz et al. [10] suggest to model misuse activities related to the flow of events in use cases by utilising an extended version of UML activity diagrams. Haley et al. [11] uses Jackson's problem diagrams to determine security requirements, which they view as constraints on functional requirements. Identification of threats is part of their approach [12] . Liu et al. [13] proposes a framework for dealing with security requirements based on the agent-oriented requirements modelling language i*. Their framework includes among other things an attacker analysis. van Lamsweerde [14] bases his approach to security requirements modelling, specification and analysis on goaloriented techniques, and suggests to develop anti-goal models.
As our focus is lightweight methods that are easy to use and learn also for software developers without extensive security knowledge, we focus on attack trees and misuse cases. These utilise well known model types such as UML use cases and tree structures, and controlled experiments indicate that they are easy to grasp [15] . In the following we give a more thorough introduction to misuse cases and attack trees.
Misuse cases.
Sindre and Opdahl [6] have suggested an extension of UML use cases in order to specify functionality that is not wanted in a system. Their purpose is to provide support for eliciting security requirements. As an addition to showing regular actor/use case relations, misuse case diagrams can model threats (misuse cases) that threaten (exploit or hinder) use cases, and countermeasures ("security use cases"
3 ) that mitigate these threats. The attacker is represented as a misuser that initiates the misuse cases, either intentionally or inadvertently. See figure 1 for an illustrative example. Ordinary use case relationships can also be used between misuse cases, and ordinary associations are used between misusers and their misuse cases. Similarly as for UML use cases, a misuse case diagram gives an overview of the threats towards a systems, while textual descriptions provides more details, including action sequences. Both a lightweight and a more extensive template for misuse case descriptions are available.
Regarding reusability of misuse cases, Sindre et al. [16] have suggested a reusable format for textual misuse cases and suggested that they are shared through a repository. We are, however, not aware of existing work on reusability of misuse case diagrams. [7] aim at modelling security threats by focusing on the attackers and the different ways they may try to attack systems. Then, based on this knowledge, system developers are more likely to design countermeasures that are able to hinder these attacks.
Attack trees. Attack trees as suggested by Schneier
In attack trees, attacks against a system are represented in a tree structure where the root node represents the attack goal. Branches in the tree represents the different paths an attacker can follow to achieve his or her goal. OR-nodes represent alternatives, while AND-nodes represent subgoals where all must be fulfilled in order for the attack to be successful. The trees can be shown graphically or be written in outline form.
Attack trees provide the possibility of adding more information to nodes, e.g. in order to indicate if the attack is possible/impossible or assign costs to each leaf node.
Regarding reusability of attack trees, Schneier points this out as "one of the things that really makes attack trees valuable". In his paper he provides an example attack tree that shows attacks against PGP, and point out that once such a tree is completed it can be reused for all systems that use PGP.
Misuse cases vs. attack trees.
We are aware of two studies that compare attack trees and misuse cases . Diallo et al. [17] has performed a limited experiment where two researchers used the different models on one single example application, and documented their experience with the model. More thorough, and thus more interesting, is the experimental comparison performed by Opdahl and Sindre [15] where they used in total 63 students and a Latin-Squares experimental design. They measured both performance (by addressing the students' solutions) and perception (by a post-task questionnaire adapted from TAM (Technology Acceptance Model)). To summarise, their most relevant results to the work presented in this paper are as follows:
• For misuse cases, students preferred misuse case diagrams over the textual notation, while attack trees were created using both diagrams and textual notation.
• Attack trees tended to result in more threats than misuse case diagrams, but it seemed that the threats identified using attack trees were more generic, detailed and purely technical. The authors refer to these types of threats as "straight out of the textbook threats".
• Misuse cases, though resulting in fewer identified threats, tended to identify more problem-specific threats, and also included user-oriented and organisational threats.
• Based on the experiment the authors got the idea that the presence of use cases in the misuse case diagrams may sometimes hinder creativity, causing modellers to only look at security treats that are directly utilising the use cases and perhaps overlooking other threats of a crosscutting nature.
• Though the different models resulted in different types of and number of threats, this was not reflected in the measurements of user perceptions. Both model types were found easy to use.
• As the experiment shows that misuse case diagrams and attack threes have different strengths, the authors suggest looking into the possibility of combining misuse cases and attack trees.
The suggestion to combine the use of attack trees and misuse cases is also supported by Diallo et al. who points out that these model types provide complementary information. To our knowledge there is one initiative that actually combine the use of misuse case diagrams and attack trees, called Suraksha [18] . As part of their recommendations for the requirement phase of a software project, they suggest to create misuse case diagrams with abstract threats, and then explore these further by creating attack trees.
Online resources.
There are reusable threat information available online, e.g. in the form of attack patterns. These resources can be used as input for threat modelling, or possibly be referenced by the models. We would like to point at two sources of such information:
• Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) 4 
Security activity models
Though threat models focus on identifying threats towards systems, and often focus less on what to do about these threats, the reason for identifying threats is to improve the ability to specify security requirements and select relevant and effective countermeasures. Information on countermeasures is included in some of the threat models, e.g. in misuse case diagrams. There are also model types that focus more directly on modelling security activities/mitigations.
Firesmith [19] handles the concept of security use cases more thoroughly, and comes with some examples of reusable textual security use case descriptions. Byers and Shahmehri [20] suggest the use of Security Activity Graphs (SAGs) that show how security activities can be combined in order to prevent vulnerabilities or causes of vulnerabilities. SAGs show tradeoffs between different security activities, and thus support the process of choosing between alternative activities. Also relevant in this setting, though more design oriented, is the concept of security patterns providing well-understood solutions to recurring security problems [21] . There are also reusable mitigation information available online, e.g. the controls 8 category available at the OWASP website. These controls are referred to from the attack and vulnerability categories mentioned in the above introduction to threat models. OWASP also provides categories for activities 9 and principles 10 , but these are not as directly related to the attack and vulnerability categories.
Support for sharing of security models
For distribution and sharing of reusable threat models it is crucial to have tool support and repository services. Requirements [22] and design [23] for a repository aimed towards developers have already been identified, and a repository solution is currently being developed as part of the SHIELDS project. Within this project we are also extending and improving an open source security modelling tool, named SeaMonster 11 [24] . The model types supported by this tool include attack trees, misuse case diagrams and SAGs. There is also an alternative modelling tool supporting both attack trees and misuse cases -the Suraksha tool [18] . In most cases it is also possible to create the different models using general purpose modelling tools. 
Linking security models
As already mentioned, results from the research of Opdahl and Sindre and Diallo et al. suggest combined use of misuse cases and attack trees as being an interesting path for further research. The Suraksha approach suggests one way of doing this where misuse case diagrams are used to model abstract threats that are explored further by creating attack trees. The abstract threat of a misuse case diagram will then be the root node of an attack tree. Our suggestions for combining misuse case diagrams and attack trees are similar to that provided by Suraksha, but we suggest showing the relations to attack trees more explicitly. This way the connection becomes more visible, resulting in the following advantages:
• It is our experience that not all misuse cases need to be detailed in attack trees -this depends on the complexity of the misuse case. By explicitly showing which misuse cases are detailed in attack trees developers will not need to spend time looking for attack trees that does not exist, and they will get a more direct request to look for attack trees when they are available.
• By explicitly showing the link to attack trees we avoid the restriction that the name of the misuse case must be the same as the root node of the attack tree. We believe this eases reusability of attack trees.
• It becomes possible to link to more than one attack tree from a misuse case, something that also may improve reusability of attack trees and allow them to be more specialised. Some of the differences in our suggestions and those of the Suraksha approach is probably due to our focus on reusability of models. Fig. 1 . Example of misuse case diagram with reference to attack tree and security activity diagram Figure 1 shows an example misuse case diagram with links to attack trees. The misuse case diagram models part of the functionality of a web application where users can upload multimedia files that then becomes available to other users.
They can also manage their profile and browse content, but for this example diagram we have only considered threats towards the upload of multimedia files. This is done to reduce the complexity of the diagram, thereby highlighting the parts concerning linking of models. The links are explicitly shown in notes connected to misuse cases and security use cases. A tool supporting our approach should have the possibility also to provide the links as hyperlinks, thereby easing the developers' job of retrieving relevant information. Note also that in the diagram security use cases have got the stereotype "security" in order to highlight their difference from ordinary use cases.
As also seen in figure 1 we have chosen to introduce the concept of linking security activity diagrams to security use cases with similar arguments and in the same way as for linking attack trees to misuse cases. A security use case often reflect a high-level suggestion to threat mitigation, which should be further elaborated, and a security activity diagram can be seen as a more detailed threat mitigation guide. The SAG mentioned in section 2.2 is one example type of a security activity diagram. Other models for representing and describing security activities and countermeasures were also mentioned in the same section. The models of this category are currently not as well-known in development communities as misuse case diagrams and attack trees are for threat modelling. For this example we have therefore chosen to use UML Activity Diagrams to express our security activities since these are well known to most developers, and in addition this notation has the qualities to express what we need. Our approach, however, is not limited to this notation. It will be possible to use SAGs instead of UML Activity Diagrams, especially if the root node of the SAG can be a security activity and not a vulnerability or cause of vulnerability as is suggested in the papers describing SAGs [20] . Figure 2 shows the example attack tree for uploading malicious content, that further explores the threat identified in the misuse case diagram. In the attack three we have provided references to CAPEC for more information. By doing this we reduce the modelling effort, as the attack tree does not need to include details that are already readily available in reusable form elsewhere. Our approach opens up for linking to other resources as well, but we have chosen to use CAPEC for this example as CAPEC is believed to be fairly stable, i.e. regarding the number scheme identifying each attack pattern. As for linking between models, we use notes (and preferably hyperlinks) to provide links to external resources. Note that the attack tree provided is not meant to be complete, but serves as an illustration. Figure 3 shows an UML Activity Diagram that describes the activity of checking that a file is of a specified type. Like for attack trees it will be possible to also provide links to external resources, e.g. security patterns. This is, however, not included in the example. Note that the security activity diagram is not meant to be complete but serves as an example of how security use cases can be further detailed by e.g. using UML Activity Diagrams. 
Practical use -an illustrative example
Until now we have presented relevant theory and our suggestions for linking different types of models in the requirement phase. Now we aim to illustrate how this approach can be used by developers. An important prerequisite for the usefulness of our approach is that the models created are available through a repository and that developers have adequate tool support for utilising the different models.
Repository services and tool support
The SHIELDS project will provide a publicly available repository of security artefacts. Security experts can populate the repository, and software developers reuse the artefacts either via automated tools or as input to manual security processes. In our case, software security experts will populate the repository with reusable and interlinked misuse case diagrams, attack trees and security activity diagrams, and developers will be able to use these models in the requirement phase. Developers are provided the means to give feedback on the artefacts they use, and thus a process of constantly improving the quality of the repository content is supported.
As part of the SHIELDS project there will also be developed tools that support modelling and use of the model types included in the repository, and in subsection 2.3 we mentioned one example, the open source SeaMonster security modelling software, as one tool that will support the approach described in this paper.
Utilising interlinked threat models in the requirement phase
Developers can search the SHIELDS repository for threat models relevant to their project. As an example, developers responsible for designing and implementing a web forum for sharing travel experiences searches the SHIELDS repository and come across the example misuse case diagram of Figure   1 , among others. By studying the diagram they find that the threats towards the use case "Share pictures or videos" are relevant also to their application as they intend users to be able to share multimedia content from their travel experiences; attackers may be able to spread malicious content by utilising the video and picture sharing functionality. They find that they want more information on how this can happen, and examine the attack tree for more details.
Studying the attack tree they find that they are concerned with attackers wanting to upload malicious code, and they follow the CAPEC references to learn more. They also examine the security activity diagram associated with the security use case "Validate that file is of correct type" to get more ideas on how to protect the application from such attacks. They find that they will add requirements saying that the application should protect from attackers uploading code files that may contain malicious code. However, they decide that protection from the more complex code upload attacks, e.g. where code is hidden and potentially encoded in the file is probably to resource demanding to implement. Instead, they decide to add a requirement stating that users of their application should be warned of the possibility that ill-intentioned users may want to upload malicious code, and as such regular users should be urged to report to the site administrators if they suspect that they have found such content on the site.
From the attack tree they also find that they are concerned with users uploading copyright protected material and inappropriate content . They do, however, not find that the threat justifies the resources required to perform validation of all new content. Instead they decide to rely on users also reporting such issues. They download the models to their own version of SeaMonster and make updates to reflect their project decisions. The result is shown in Figure 4 . In this case the developers chose to make updates just to the misuse case diagram, but they could also have made changes to the attack tree or security activity diagram if they wanted.
Based on the threat and security activity models found in the SHIELDS repository the developers can now create Fig. 3 . Example Security Activity Diagram security requirements and make security design decisions coming from their own knowledge, although they are not themselves security experts. They can also provide feedback on the models that they used, e.g. that they found that one of the security use cases suggested was not considered relevant for them, but that they instead chose a countermeasure that was not currently covered by the models. 
Evaluation
We have not yet been able to perform a full evaluation of the approach presented in this paper. We have, however, performed a controlled experiment focusing on reuse of misuse case diagrams coupled with attack trees. Full details on the research method used and the results of this paper will be published in another paper. But as some of the results provide useful feedback on the approach presented here, we include a brief introduction to the experiment and the relevant results.
The experiment was performed with seven software developers from two different development companies. The purpose was to try out two different approaches to misuse case diagram reuse in order to find if they were useful to developers and possibly say something about which approach was preferred. In both approaches misuse cases were linked with attack trees using notes, equal to what is suggested in this paper. After creating their own misuse case diagrams based on each approach the participants had to state whether they Strongly agreed, Agreed, were Neutral, Disagreed or Strongly Disagreed to some statements. The statements relevant for interlinking of misuse cases and attack trees were as follows:
• It was easy to find relevant attack trees using this method • The attack trees that were suggested were mostly irrelevant • I hardly used the provided attack tree forest • The attack tree forest seemed pretty complete We call the collection of attack trees presented to the test subjects as attack tree forests. Results indicate that the link between misuse case diagrams and attack trees were understandable. Participants found that they were able to identify relevant attack trees. They did, however, not agree on the relevance of the attack trees suggested, and did use the attack trees provided to different extent. One reason for the limited use of the attack trees is likely due to the focus of the experiment, since the participants were only required to create misuse case diagrams for a given application, not to go further into identifying requiremens or selecting threat mitigation strategies.
Discussion and Further Work
We have suggested an approach for using misuse case diagrams, attack trees and security activity models together. With our approach misuse case diagrams give an overview of the threats towards an application, and the other model types provide more details on threats and countermeasures. We also suggest to link models to online resources like CAPEC. We plan to further evaluate the suggested approach in experiments in order to find if it meets the needs of developers in the requirement phase and if combining models is better than using the different model types more independently. Experiments are also needed to find improvements to our approach.
We have focused on combining different model types in order to utilise their different strengths. We are, however, aware that there exists alternatives to our way of doing this. One obvious alternative is to include everything in the misuse case diagram. Sindre et al. [25] has documented how it is possible to utilise the UML notation for generalisation and includes relationships in order to represent attack trees with (mis)use case notation. Probably it is also possible to use the same approach to include more information on alternative security activities. However, doing this will make the misuse case diagrams more complex, and thereby less suited to providing an overview of threats towards an application. Another alternative to our approach is to relate countermeasures more directly to the nodes in the attack trees. This makes sense as developers can more easily see that a branch in an attack tree is actually well handled and can therefore be viewed as impossible or at least expensive from the view of an attacker. We have, however, chosen to specify countermeasures as security use cases and security activity models not directly coupled with attack trees, as this approach does not require developers to study attack trees in detail if they are confident that their knowledge of a threat is satisfactory. A third option is to include information from attack trees and security activity models as part of the textual descriptions of misuse cases and security use cases. The template for textual descriptions as suggested by Sindre et al. [6] includes the possibility to describe basic and alternative paths, threats, misuser profiles, technology and data variations and mitigation points. However, we believe that providing more of this information in a visual form gives easier overview for developers.
In our approach we have suggested to show links between models and links to external resources as notes. As a result there is no need to extend the model notation with new symbols, but inclusion of many notes in a diagram may result in the overall diagram becoming messy. Though experiments indicate that the developers did understand this way of linking models, more experience and evaluation is needed to find if using notes is indeed a good way of representing links, or if another approach is needed. When more experience is gained on the use of the links between models suggested here, more research should also be performed on the usefulness of providing links to other resources and models, e.g. security requirements and resources for security inspection or testing. Especially this should be done for the other model types and resources included in the SHIELDS repository, as outlined in Rios et al. [26] .
Linking models only really makes sense if there exit tools that can utilise the links and help users navigate easily back and forth between the models. This will be supported by the SHIELDS repository and the SeaMonster modelling tool. Linking of models is also likely to be more useful in the context of reuse of models than if models are created for only one individual project. This is because, when modelling for reuse, one is likely to afford to spend more time and resources on the models, and not only include the most relevant information for a given application. However, as the number of available models grows there is a potential problem with maintenance of links, as e.g. models change, are deleted, or new relevant models are added to the repository. The SHIELDS repository will require that an endorsement process is performed for all updates to models, and handling the problem of link maintenance will be part of this process.
Conclusion
Based on the results of research performed by Opdahl and Sindre and Diallo et al. we have suggested an approach for combining misuse cases and attack trees with a focus on use in the requirement phase of software engineering projects. We also suggest to detail security use cases by creating security activity models, e.g. in the form of UML Activity Diagrams, and to provide developers with links to external resources for more information about threats and countermeasures. The suggestions are made with reuse of models in mind, and will be supported by an online repository of security models and with an open source modelling tool. The approach needs to be further validated in experiments in order to find if the approach is useful for developers, and to identify improvements.
